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Abstract: 
I argue that ductal carcinoma in situ (DCIS), the tumor most commonly diagnosed by 
breast mammography, cannot be confidently classified as cancer, i.e. as pathological.  
This is because there may not be dysfunction present in DCIS – as I argue based on its 
high prevalence and the small amount of risk it conveys – and thus DCIS may not count 
as a disease by dysfunction-requiring approaches, such as Boorse’s Biostatistical Theory 
and Wakefield’s Harmful Dysfunction Account. Patients should decide about treatment 
for DCIS based on the risks it poses and the risks and benefits of treatment, not on its 
disease status. 
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Small Tumors as Risk Factors not Disease 
 
1.  Introduction: 
 In this paper I argue that it is unclear whether ductal carcinoma in situ (DCIS), 
the tumor most commonly diagnosed by breast mammography, is really a cancer, i.e. 
pathological.  In particular, it is not clear that there is dysfunction present in DCIS, and 
thus it is not clear if it counts as a disease according to a dysfunction-requiring account 
such as Christopher Boorse’s Biostatistical Theory (Boorse 1977, 1987, 1997) or Jerome 
Wakefield’s Harmful Dysfunction Account (Wakefield 1992a, b).  This uncertainty stems 
from the high prevalence of DCIS and the limited amount of risk that it conveys.   
In the end, I will argue, we may infer the presence of a system that is functioning 
below average but perhaps not poorly enough to count as dysfunctioning.  The question 
of how to classify DCIS reflects the “line drawing problem” for determining when 
dysfunction is present (Schwartz 2007b, Hausman 2012).  At the same time, the question 
of whether doctors should offer treatment to patients with DCIS does not depend on 
whether DCIS is a disease, but instead on whether the benefits of treatment outweigh the 
burdens or risks (Vickers, Basch, and Kattan 2008)(Omer et al. 2013). 
 
2.  Risk-Based Diseases and the Biostatistical Theory (BST) 
I have argued that most people diagnosed with high blood pressure (hypertension) 
and high cholesterol (hypercholesterolemia) are actually healthy, i.e. have no 
pathological condition, but instead have a risk factor for future disease, such as stroke, 
heart attack, and other conditions (Schwartz 2008).  Given a “dysfunction-requiring” 
theory such as the Biostatistical Theory (Boorse 1977, 1987, 1997) or the Harm 
Dysfunction Account (Wakefield 1992a, b) a condition can only count as a disease if 
there is biological dysfunction present.  And I have argued that for hypertension and 
hypercholesterolemia there is no reason to conclude that a part is dysfunctioning, i.e. 
failing to carry out its function (Schwartz 2008).   
While my previous discussion focused on high blood pressure and high 
cholesterol, it appears that similar points can be made for other “risk-based” diseases, 
including diabetes, osteoporosis, and obesity (Schwartz 2008).  In all these cases, the 
process by which medical science determines the existence and boundaries of the disease 
and indication for treatment is very clear.  Epidemiological or observational research 
shows a correlation between some parameter (blood pressure, serum cholesterol, blood 
sugar, bone mineralization, or body mass index) and the chance of developing a certain 
disease in the future.  Then a clinical study, hopefully at least one randomized, controlled, 
double-blinded trial, shows that among individuals whose parameter falls above a certain 
line (e.g. a systolic blood pressure above 160 mm Hg), those that get a certain treatment 
have a lower risk of a future disease than those who get a placebo (Greene 2007, 
Chobanian et al. 2003, Westin and Heath 2005). 
 Of the two most prominent dysfunction-requiring theories, I will focus here, as 
previously, on applying Boorse’s Biostatistical Theory, whose three key definitions are as 
follows: 
1.  The reference class is a natural class of organisms of uniform functional 
design; specifically, an age group of a sex of a species. 
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2.  A normal function of a part or process within members of the reference 
class is a statistically typical contribution by it to their individual survival and 
reproduction. 
3.  A disease is a type of internal state which is either  
 [a] an impairment of normal functional ability, i.e. a reduction of one or 
more functional abilities below typical efficiency, or  
 [b] a limitation on functional ability caused by environmental agents.   
 (1997, 7-8, formatting and numbering added under (3)) 
Most conditions are classified as disease based on criterion (3a).  Take congestive 
heart failure (CHF) in a 50-year-old man, for instance.  The human heart counts as 
having the function of pumping blood since this is what it does that typically 
contributes to survival and reproduction in 50-year-old men (Premises 1 and 2).  
Assume that the heart in a typical 50-year-old man has an “ejection fraction” (EF) – 
the percent of blood pushed out by each contraction – of 50%, and that the heart of 
the individual with CHF has an EF of just 15%.  Thus his heart is beating 
significantly “below typical efficiency” and counts as pathological according to 
Premise (3a).   
As I argued previously (Schwartz 2008), when one looks at risk-based diseases 
like hypertension, it seems that the relevant organs are carrying out their typical functions 
with adequate effectiveness. For example, the combination of organs and feedback 
systems that determine blood pressure – including the cardiovascular, excretory, and 
endocrine systems – has at least one very clear function: keeping the pressure high 
enough that organs remain perfused, without becoming so high that the pressure 
interferes with perfusion or causes immediate damage.  And the blood pressure in 
individuals with Stage 1 hypertension is in a range that allows all these things to happen 
(Systolic blood pressure 140-160 mm Hg; Diastolic blood pressure 80-90 mm Hg). 
The only possibility of inferring the presence of dysfunction in the case of Stage 1 
hypertension would be in relation to another function that one might assign to the blood 
pressure system, i.e. of keeping blood pressure in a range that will minimize the chance 
of future heart attack or stroke.  While I have argued that this is a somewhat peculiar 
sounding function (Schwartz 2008), let’s assume for now that it does qualify as a 
function by Premise 2 of the BST (c.f. Boorse 2012, manuscript).  Then the question is 
whether the organs and feedback systems that determine blood pressure should be 
counted as failing to carry out this function adequately in patients with Stage 1 
hypertension.   
But answering this question raises complex questions (Schwartz 2007b).  Here’s 
the issue:  For some token part or process to count as dysfunctioning, it is not enough if it 
is just carrying out some function below an average level for individuals of that age and 
gender.  Go back to the example of heart beating and CHF:  Some 50 year old men with 
healthy hearts may have an EF as high as 60% or as low as 40%, based on genetics or 
training, etc.  And while an EF of 40% may fall below average for this reference class, 
and may carry some undesirable consequences (such as inability to achieve certain feats 
of endurance), it may still count as falling within the range of normal variation, and not as 
dysfunctional. Clearly, functioning must fall significantly below the typical level to count 
as dysfunctional; otherwise, all individuals below average would count as diseased.  
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Somewhere in the continuum we must draw a line where “normal variation” ends and 
where dysfunction begins (Schwartz 2007b). 
The two key factors in drawing this line appear to be some combination of 
prevalence and severity of negative impact.  In his comments on this topic, Boorse 
suggests that only prevalence matters (c.f., 1987, 370; 1997, 8).  According to this 
approach, determining whether a level of functioning counts as dysfunctional just as long 
as it is below average and expressed by a very few members of the reference class.  The 
attraction of the prevalence view is that it doesn’t seem to require any judgment about the 
value of the level of functioning, which fits with Boorse’s naturalistic approach.  Boorse 
admits that the location of the precise line is “arbitrary” (1987, 371) and “can only be 
conventionally chosen” (1977, 559). 
Even with these caveats, a prevalence approach cannot work, I have argued 
(Schwartz 2007b).  For at least some traits and some reference classes, even a low level 
of functioning that is extremely rare may not be pathological.  For instance, if among 20-
year-old men, the highest functional efficiency is 65% and the lowest is 58%, and all can 
carry out all standard activities with no problem, there is no reason to assume that any of 
them have congestive heart failure (the “problem of healthy populations”) (Schwartz 
2007b). 
At the same time, for other traits and reference classes, many more than just the 
lowest functioning few in the reference class may count as dysfunctioning (the “problem 
of common diseases”).  For example, the prevalence of serious dysfunction of the hip 
joint, termed “canine hip dysplasia” is 30% in some breeds of dogs; Alzheimer’s disease 
occurs in 16% in people over 85 years old (see Schwartz 2007b).  Boorse did allow that 
some levels of functioning could count as dysfunction not based on their prevalence but 
instead because they are caused by “environmental agents” (1997, 8; Premise 3b, above).  
But these two conditions do not seem to be clearly of that sort.  
It appears that, in addition to considering prevalence, there must be some 
judgment about whether the level of functioning of the trait token has significant negative 
consequences (Schwartz 2007b).  If a level of functioning has serious negative 
consequences, then even if it is relatively common, it can count as dysfunctioning.  If a 
level of functioning has no negative consequences, then it should not count as 
dysfunction, even if this is the lowest level in a given reference class, expressed by just 1 
in 1,000,000 individuals in that reference class.  There are some problems with this 
approach, and Dan Hausman has recently made excellent suggestions regarding this 
(Hausman 2012).   
Without delving more deeply into these issues, we can conclude that determining 
whether a blood pressure should be counted as reflecting dysfunction or not must depend 
on some mix of prevalence and negative consequences.  And by this test, it appears that 
in many cases of Stage 1 hypertension, there will be no good reason to infer the presence 
of dysfunction.  For example, a 60-year-old man with blood pressure 145/70 counts as 
having Stage 1 hypertension by current guidelines and should be started on treatment.  
But this blood pressure is at the median for men his age and conveys a minimal increase 
in risk over what it would be if his blood pressure were 120/50, which is optimal 
(Chobanian et al. 2003).   
What matters to the authors of guidelines is the very simple fact that a blood 
pressure of this level puts him in a group where we know with relative certainty that he 
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can safely reduce his chance of a cardiovascular event if he takes certain pills.  The 
comparison blood pressure and risk is the lower blood pressure he will have on these 
pills, not anything about the blood pressure of other members of this reference class.   
Similar arguments apply to the condition of high cholesterol.  Based on research 
showing beneficial effects of starting a “statin” medication, a 60-year-old man with a low 
density lipoprotein (LDL) of 105 mg/dL and certain other risk factors may count as 
having “high cholesterol.”  But at the same time, this LDL is significantly below the 
median for this reference group and is probably not even that much higher than in 
primitive populations (National Cholesterol Education Program (NCEP) Expert Panel on 
Detection 2002)(Westin and Heath 2005). 
 Accounts that do not require the presence of dysfunction for disease may 
conclude that both hypertension and hypercholesterolemia are pathological.  For instance, 
according to the malady account (Clouser, Culver, and Gert 1981), high cholesterol or 
high blood pressure may well count as pathology due the increased risk they convey.  
That said, such accounts are generally more liberal in identifying the presence of disease, 
and thus are subject to counterexamples such as classifying pregnancy as disease (Boorse 
1997, Schwartz 2007a). 
Note as well that giving up calling these conditions diseases has no impact on the 
moral imperative for doctors to diagnose and treat them.  Most accounts of the goals of 
medicine recognizes that contributing to wellbeing by preventing a case of disease is just 
as important and admirable as contributing to wellbeing by treating or ameliorating the 
effects of a disease (Daniels 2008, Miller and Brody 2001).  In short, there is nothing 
wrong with offering people a pill to reduce their risk of cardiovascular disease, but this 
should not be equated with diagnosing them with a disease. 
 
3.  Screening and Asymptomatic Cancers 
A natural next question is whether asymptomatic cancers detected by cancer 
screening tests are diseases or not.  All screening tests – including mammograms for 
breast cancer, colonoscopies for colon cancer, prostate specific antigen for prostate 
cancer, and pap smears for cervical cancer – identify many tumors that are too small to 
feel and are not causing any problem.  In each case, the presence of the small tumor is not 
interfering with the functioning of the organ involved.  For instance, for a 60-year-old 
man, a small prostate cancer does not interfere with the prostate gland making its usual 
contributions to his survival and reproduction; the man’s ability to father a child is not 
affected.  The breast of a 50-year-old woman typically makes no contribution to survival 
and reproduction, due to the unlikelihood of nursing a child at this age, and, anyway, a 
breast with a small breast cancer can produce milk just as well as one without a small 
cancer.  Only when a cancer spreads or metastasizes does it cause clear dysfunction. 
Finally, in a key analogy, screening tests are justified on the same basis as 
treatments for risk-based diseases like hypertension and high cholesterol:  tests are 
recommended based on evidence from randomized, controlled trials that undergoing 
screening and follow up care (including removing asymptomatic tumors) reduces 
mortality and morbidity (USPSTF 2008). 
If one is going to make a case for the presence of dysfunction in the case of 
asymptomatic tumors, one must look at the functioning of cellular processes that 
contribute to survival and reproduction by blocking unrestrained growth and spread of 
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cells (i.e. cancer).  The natural history of cancer is well understood:  it begins with a 
single cell that undergoes some changes – either in a gene or genes, or involving some 
protein or gene product – that leads it to start dividing.  As the cell’s progeny continue to 
divide, some acquire additional changes that confer the ability to divide more actively 
and to spread in that organ and metastasize to other organs, where it eventually maims or 
kills.  A tumor will often become palpable only once it has grown to 109 cells, and at this 
size often some cells have already spread elsewhere, so removing the primary tumor no 
longer produces cure.  Screening technologies try to find tumors when they are smaller, 
sometimes 106 cells, either before they become cancerous or before they have spread, 
when treatment can be easier and more effective (Croswell, Brawley, and Kramer 2011).  
With this picture in mind, we can see why one might infer that even small tumors 
should be classified as pathological according to a dysfunction-requiring account.  The 
changes that lead the cell to change in shape, start dividing, and acquire the ability to 
spread may be assumed to involve the dysfunctioning of systems that typically block the 
changes that turn the cell into a killing machine. 
To examine this picture in some more detail, consider the following:  All cells in 
the body arise from growth and differentiation from the single cell of the fertilized egg.  
In each tissue, specific changes occur that lead the cells to differentiate and usually stop 
dividing.  And the resulting aspects of genetics or cellular machinery can be seen as 
contributing to survival and reproduction by causing the differentiation and restraining 
further division, and thus have this function as their function, by Boorse’s Premise 2.  
In real life, this is all incredibly complex and varies from tissue to tissue, or 
course.  But assume for simplicity that differentiation and non-division in some tissue is 
brought about by turning off two genes (call them a and b) and turning on two others 
(call them c and d).  Thus, we might characterize the Differentiation and non-Division 
(DD) system in this cell as involving the following all four of these genes, as well as any 
other genes and proteins that they interact with to cause differentiation and to restrain 
division.  On the simplest conception, then, when a cell of this type starts to divide and 
dedifferentiate, some element of the DD system may be assumed to be malfunctioning.  
For instance, perhaps a and b start being transcribed and translated into proteins again, 
due to failure of the mechanisms that usually keeps them from doing so.  Or c or d stop 
making their proteins, or other changes in the cell block their proteins from having their 
usual effects.  
One may resist this inference that dysfunction is occurring by raising the 
possibility that the dedifferentiation and division may be occurring due to cellular 
changes that have nothing to do with the elements of DD listed above.  Maybe, for 
instance, a has not started making its gene product, but some other gene, call it e, which 
is usually not involved, has mutated (call it e’ ) and is now producing a novel protein that 
has the same effect as a’s gene product.  In other words, DD is functioning normally, but 
dedifferentiation and division are occurring due to the action of something outside that 
system.   
At the same time, there appear to be two ways to defend the inference of 
dysfunction, even in such cases.  First, the ability of e’ to stimulate dedifferentiation and 
division may be seen as interfering with a broader system that involves DD but also other 
elements of the cell (call it DD+).  DD+ would certainly also count as having the function 
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of maintaining differentiation and restraining division, and this broader system may be 
seen as dysfunctioning, due to e’, even if DD is not.   
Second, even without defining a broader system DD+, one might conclude, given 
the mutation in e and the dangerous consequences of the gene product e’, that there must 
be at least some signaling system or other cellular process that is failing to carry out its 
usual function, i.e. make its usual contribution to survival and reproduction.   
At this point, we’ve gotten a bit removed from specific biological examples, so 
I’m going to leave that discussion there.  For the rest of this paper, I’ll assume that we 
can assume that there is a system that is functioning below its optimal level, at least, 
when dedifferentiation and division of the cell occurs.   
Then we can go back to the question that started this section:  When does the 
decreased functioning of DD count as dysfunction, rather than just below-average or sub-
optimal functioning?  Is it at the point when gene a or b turn on, even a little bit?  Or 
when c or d turn off, or just don’t produce at the highest level, or their gene products have 
somewhat diminished efficacy at maintaining differentiation and non-division? 
To put it in terms of the changes in the cell:  Can we conclude that DD is 
dysfunctioning if the cell has become just slightly less differentiated than other cells of 
the same type?  Once it starts dividing?  Once it is dividing and has also acquired 
additional changes?  Or only after it is dividing and has acquired the ability to invade 
tissue and spread to other organs, the signs of truly dangerous cancer?   
I will argue that it is quite hard to draw a line in this progression where 
suboptimal or below-average functioning of the DD system has transitioned over to 
dysfunctioning.  One could draw the line at the first change, perhaps when dividing has 
started to occur.  Or one could make an argument, in at least some cases, for holding off 
until the final step, once the cell has acquired the ability to invade tissue and metastasize.  
I will argue that many of these ways of drawing the line are acceptable and make no 
appreciable difference in the practice of medicine.  It makes the difference between 
whether intervention counts as treatment or prevention, but not whether such 
interventions should be covered be carried out by physicians or covered by health 
insurance. 
At the same time, biological science and pathology depend on drawing this line, 
since it determines what counts as normal or healthy and what abnormal and unhealthy. 
And despite the fact that the location of the line is somewhat arbitrary, I will argue that it 
is a necessary part of biological science to choose one of the spots. 
 
4.  Ductal Carcinoma in Situ (DCIS): 
To consider this question more closely, I’ll focus on the example of ductal 
carcinoma in situ (DCIS), a type of breast cancer that has taken on great importance with 
the advent of widespread mammographic screening.  DCIS has “all the morphologic 
features of malignancy, but without any evidence of basement membrane penetration” 
(Erbas et al. 2006, 136).  It falls on a continuum from normal cells in the epithelium 
lining the ducts, to atypical ductal hyperplasia made up of cells that are dividing and 
starting to look abnormal, to DCIS when they are starting to look just like cancer cells 
but have not penetrated the basement membrane.  When the cells penetrate the basement 
membrane, they become invasive ductal carcinoma (Erbas et al. 2006). 
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This is a cancer that was diagnosed relatively rarely in the era before 
mammography – in 1973, the incidence rate for women was 2.4 per 100,000 per year – 
but mammography made more common:  in 1992 it had risen to 15.8 per 100,000 (Erbas 
et al. 2006, Ernster et al. 1996).   Out of all the tumors identified in mammography 
screening programs, DCIS makes up about 15-25% of them.  And when DCIS is found, it 
is treated by lumpectomy or mastectomy, sometimes with chemotherapy or radiation, and 
these treatments have been shown to diminish the risk of developing IDC in that breast 
(Kuerer et al. 2009). 
The progression from normal epithelial cells, to ADH, to DCIS, and then to IDC 
thus provides a real-life example of the sort of sequence we discussed in the model of the 
last section.  And for each step in this sequence we may ask whether that type of cell 
should be classified as pathology, i.e. a case where dysfunction can be inferred, or as a 
normal type of cell, admittedly one that has some increased chance of progressing to 
cancer in a certain time frame.  Even at the first step, when ADH develops, one might 
infer that the DD system is no longer functioning as well as it did when they were 
normal.  But has it crossed over from suboptimal functioning, perhaps below-average 
functioning, to dysfunctioning?   We can ask this again as the cell becomes DCIS and 
then IDC.  
As discussed above, answering this line-drawing problem appears to depend on 
both the prevalence and negative consequences of each condition (Schwartz 2007b).  And 
for each condition, the negative consequences have to be understood in terms of the risk 
the lesion will progress, spread, and cause morbidity and mortality.   
Let’s talk about prevalence first.  As mentioned above, the rate at which DCIS is 
diagnosed is quite low; even with a universal screening program, the rate is under 16 per 
100,000 (Erbas et al. 2006).  But the question of how much undiagnosed DCIS is out 
there has to come from pathological studies of breasts of women who die from other 
causes.  These studies vary along a number of dimensions, including the age of the 
women, the type of autopsy (including the thickness of slicing), and the criteria used.  
One review of a range of studies points to a median prevalence of 8.9% (Welch and 
Black 1997).  The data for the prevalence of ADH is also complicated and inconclusive 
(Erbas et al. 2006), but it is not unreasonable to assume it is about twice that of DCIS.   
For the rest of this paper, I’m going to focus on the reference class of women who are 50 
years old and assume that the prevalence of DCIS is 10% and ADH is 20%, with “normal 
cells” making up the other 70%. 
Now for risk.  First, it’s crucial to remember that even if untreated, DCIS does not 
always progress to breast cancer. A woman with DCIS may die for other reasons before it 
progresses, or the lesion may not progress, or the breast tissue involved may “involute,” 
before the DCIS progresses, eliminating it (Erbas et al. 2006).  But assuming a 50 year 
old woman has DCIS and that she lives 20 years, how often will the DCIS progress to 
IDC?  Again, the science is inconclusive and variable.  The best data comes from studies 
where researchers reviewed biopsy specimens that were read as “normal” and identify 
those where DCIS was missed, and then contact those women.  One large review of 
almost 12,000 biopsies found 28 cases misread in this way, and that cancer had 
developed in 7 of them within 15 years (25%) (Page et al. 1982).  Another review of over 
9000 biopsies found 80 that harbored DCIS, and of these 11 (13.7%) had developed 
cancer over an average of 17.5 years (Eusebi et al. 1994).  To simplify for the purpose of 
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this paper, I’m going to assume that for a 50-year-old woman, in general, untreated DCIS 
has an average chance of about 25% of progressing over 20 years to invasive cancer.   
 So, if a 50-year-old woman learns that she has an area of DCIS, how much of an 
increased risk does she have than the baseline case?  At least one model suggests that a 
typical 50-year-old woman has about a 3.5% chance of developing palpable or 
symptomatic DCIS by the age of 70.  Let’s use that number for our baseline. 
 The final challenge is to estimate the risk of ADH progressing to DCIS and then 
IDC.  There’s no simple way to estimate or interpolate this risk; for the purposes of 
discussion, let’s assume it’s about 10%.  This produces the following picture of 
prevalence and risk (Table 1): 
 
 
Table 1.  Estimates of prevalence and chance of progression 
 
                Cell Type 
       Normal ADH  DCIS  
Prevalence among 50-year-old  women  70%  20%  10% 
Chance of progression to sIDC in 20 years 3.5%  10%  25%  
(sIDC = symptomatic or palpable IDC) 
 
 
 
 As mentioned above, and with these numbers fleshing out the picture, we can see 
that if prevalence in the reference class fully determines the line between low normal and 
abnormal levels of functioning, then even DCIS will not harbor a dysfunctional DD 
system.  Prevalence-focused approaches generally focus on levels of functioning that are 
in just the lowest few percentile for a reference class of individuals, i.e. about two 
standard deviations from the mean given a normal distribution (Boorse 1987, 370; 1997, 
8).  And DCIS is present (we are assuming) in about 10% of 50-year-old women.   
 But now let’s turn to the magnitude of negative consequences.  In the case of 
DCIS, it is hard to determine whether the increase in risk is large enough to justify the 
conclusion that the DD system is dysfunctioning.  On the one hand, a 25% risk of 
progression to symptomatic IDC over 20 years is impressive; on the other hand, fully 
75% of women with DCIS, according to this assumption, will not develop IDC in this 
time period.  Do they have a dysfunction that has not led to negative consequences, or a 
system that is functioning at relatively low levels, not yet dysfunctional? 
There are no clear guidelines for such judgment.  Similarly for ADH, there may 
be significant vagueness about whether the DD system is dysfunctional.  Compared to 
DCIS, prevalence is higher and the risk of progression to IDC is lower, but even here 
there has been a three-fold increase over the baseline case.  The DD system is not 
functioning optimally, and it seems that one could make the case for seeing it as 
dysfunctional even at this point.   
At the same time, one could go the other way and resist concluding that 
dysfunction is present until actual IDC has developed.  As mentioned above, autopsy 
studies suggest that fully 1.3% of women have IDC.  These are tumors that were 
undetected when the woman was alive, so we may assume that many of them are not yet 
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sIDC, i.e. not yet palpable or symptomatic.  If the woman had lived, presumably there 
would have been a reasonably high chance of progression and spread over some time 
period.  
Remember that we are assuming, based on the best evidence available, that DCIS 
has a 25% of progression to symptomatic IDC.  Of course, even without harboring any 
DCIS cells, a 50 year old woman may have this sort of risk of developing IDC in the next 
20 years, based on factors such as family history, genetics, age of menarche, number of 
children etc.  (Online calculators are available to calculate the risk, based on 
epidemiological data.)   Presumably, if the risk that DCIS conveys justifies the 
conclusion that the DD system is dysfunctioning, the cellular or genetic characteristics 
that convey this risk may count as disease as well, even without any pathological change 
in the appearance of the cells. 
 
5.  Conclusion: 
My main conclusion, then, is that there is significant uncertainty about whether 
DCIS can be inferred to harbor a dysfunctional DD system.  Instead, it appears possible 
to assert or deny that dysfunction is present in ADH, DCIS, and perhaps even 
asymptomatic IDC.  There is a line-drawing question here, about when the functioning of 
the DD system should be counted as dysfunctioning vs. simply suboptimal or below 
average.   
Science now understands much more about the progression of normal cells to 
cancer and the prevalence and risk associated with each stage.  Much more needs to be 
done to identify the specific molecular changes involved and the heterogeneity of each of 
the currently recognized cell types.  Discoveries in this area will allow doctors to do 
better at predicting individuals’ risk of developing cancer, and such information may 
inform decision making about possible preventive steps, whether or not the condition is 
itself pathological or not.   
As mentioned above for the case of high blood pressure and high cholesterol, 
counting DCIS as a disease or not does not change whether most systems of healthcare 
ethics or justice would see its treatment as justified.  Even if DCIS is not a disease, as 
long as treating it can significantly reduce the risk of developing symptomatic IDC, and 
can do so safely and with acceptable expense and burden to the patient, then that 
treatment is justified as prevention.  
From this perspective, deciding whether DCIS counts as disease may be seen as 
distracting from the key questions involved in evaluating preventive care (Vickers, 
Basch, and Kattan 2008).  And this is certainly right, to some extent:  the judgment of 
whether a condition is a disease is separate from whether it carries risks and whether 
there are treatments that can reduce that risk without imposing unacceptable burdens, 
cost, or new risks.  In fact, simply describing DCIS as a disease, if done without 
emphasizing the assessment of risk and benefit in choosing treatment, might interfere 
with helping individuals determine whether to undertake certain steps for risk reduction.  
A recent study has shown that describing DCIS as a disease has a significant impact on 
patient decisions about treatment, even if there is no change in how the risks and benefits 
of treatment are described (Omer et al. 2013). 
At the same time, this conclusion does not support the view that defining disease 
has become entirely irrelevant to directing medical care (Vickers, Basch, and Kattan 
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2008).  Even if it doesn’t matter if DCIS is a disease, it still matters that at least 
symptomatic IDC is a disease, and that the treatment of DCIS is a form of disease 
prevention. Medicine has long identified itself as focused on the prevention and treatment 
of disease, and good arguments have been offered for continuing this focus (Daniels 
2008).  Seeing medicine in this way relies on being able to draw lines between normal, 
healthy conditions and abnormal or pathological ones, and while there are complexities 
and challenges to such line drawing, it is still central, and essential, to medicine. 
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